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In a controversial new proposal, Vitalik Buterin suggests reducing the number of PoS validators from almost 1 million to just 8,192 to reduce complexity.
In a new proposal released On December 27, ethereum (eth) co-founder Vitalik Buterin outlined a plan to dramatically simplify ethereum's proof-of-stake (PoS) system to reduce complexity and expand design possibilities.
The current PoS system attempts to support decentralization by allowing many validators (currently almost 900,000). However, Buterin maintains that this creates significant complexity, trade-offs, and limitations, without fully achieving the goal of accessibility for small-scale staking due to the minimum requirement of 32 eth.
Instead, Buterin proposes reducing the number of signatures per space to just 8,192 from the current plan of more than 1.7 million. This would allow for major simplifications in ethereum, make the transition to quantum resistance much easier, and keep the cost for attacks between 1 and 2 million eth, which Buterin suggested is high enough:
Even an attack cost of 1 to 2 million eth should be completely sufficient.
Vitalik Buterin
Developer Micah Zoltu commented on the proposal, noting that the cost of this attack may be insufficient. According to him, numerous actors have these types of resources and, sooner or later, they can turn against the protocol:
There are many governments around the world that spend that amount on a missile or a plane. We should design systems that are resistant to state attackers who are willing to spend money to ruin your day.
While 1-2 (million) eth can enough to deter them from attacking, we have evidence that they will spend much more than this to achieve their goals, and many governments seem to be headed in the direction of “destroy cryptocurrencies” as one of their goals.
Of course, I also can't say that 9 (million) eth is enough, or maybe both are more than enough! However, I don't think it's as obvious as you imply that we can safely reduce the security budget. Lindy doesn't apply to these things, because everything will be fine until it isn't and suddenly everything is very, very bad.
Micah Zoltu
The last part of the statement refers to the Lindy Effect, the theory that the future life expectancy of some non-perishable things like a technology or an idea is proportional to their current age, so things that have been around for a long time are more He is likely to stay longer.
In this context, when Zoltu states, “Lindy doesn't apply to these things,” he argues that just because ethereum's high level of security has been sufficient until now, doesn't mean it will necessarily continue to be so.
Buterin outlines three potential approaches to making this reduced signature scheme work: relying entirely on decentralized betting pools, using a two-tier system with lighter and heavier wagering requirements, or rotating participation between slots to maintain accountability.
The proposal has drawn comments from developers like Zoltu, who questioned whether the attack's reduced cost of 1 to 2 million eth would be enough to deter attackers at the state level. Buterin acknowledged that this was a fair criticism and that the optimal cost remains unclear.
The upcoming debate over this and other PoS proposals will likely be more vibrant than ever in the ethereum community.
